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IDENTITY LEADERSHIP IN THE STANFORD PRISON
Abstract
The Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) is one of the most famous studies in the history of 
psychology. For nearly a half century it has been understood to show that assigning people to 
a toxic role will, on its own, unlock the human capacity to treat others with cruelty. In 
contrast, principles of identity leadership argue that roles are unlikely to elicit cruelty unless 
leaders encourage potential perpetrators to identify with what is presented as a noble ingroup 
cause and to believe their actions are necessary for the advancement of that cause. Although 
identity leadership has been implicated in behaviour ranging from electoral success to 
obedience to authority, researchers have hitherto had limited capacity to establish whether 
role conformity or identity leadership provides a better account of the cruelty observed in the 
SPE. Through examination of material in the SPE archive, we present comprehensive 
evidence that, rather than Guards conforming to role of their own accord, Experimenters 
directly encouraged them to adopt roles and act tough in a manner consistent with tenets of 
identity leadership. Implications for the analysis of conformity and cruelty as well as for 
interpretation of the SPE are discussed. 
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Rethinking the nature of cruelty:
The role of identity leadership in the Stanford Prison Experiment 
In August 1971, Professor Philip Zimbardo and his research team recruited 24 young 
men to participate in a study on prison life. The volunteer participants were randomly 
assigned to be either Prisoners or Guards in a mock prison that had been constructed in the 
basement of the Stanford psychology department. After just a few days Guards began to 
repress the Prisoners and their cruelty escalated, up to the point where, after six days, the 
study was prematurely terminated. What happened during that week — and what it means for
our understanding of human behavior — has been the focus of scientific and public debate 
for the past half century.
The Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE; Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973a, 1973b) is 
one of the most famous psychology studies of all time. It is covered in most introductory 
psychology and social psychology textbooks and courses (Bartels, Milovich, & Moussier, 
2016; Griggs, 2014; Griggs & Whitehead, 2014) and is a standard point of reference for 
media stories on tyranny and repression. The study has also been presented to government 
officials and in court cases to help understand events ranging from prison riots to the abuse of
detainees during the Iraq War. On top of this, it has provided the material for an extremely 
influential website (Zimbardo, 1999), a best-selling book on evil (Zimbardo, 2007), and 
several feature films that have grossed over 12 million dollars at the Box Office (Alvarez, 
2015, Scheuring, 2010; see also Hirschbiegel, 2001). As a result, the study has had a major 
role to play in shaping how millions of people think both about the nature of human cruelty 
and about the power of the situation to encourage toxic behavior.
The SPE became famous for the striking evidence it appeared to provide that normal, 
well-adjusted young men could come to harm innocent civilians simply as a consequence of 
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having been randomly assigned the role of Guard (rather than Prisoner). Zimbardo and his 
colleagues have expressed this provocative idea in a number of slightly different ways to 
different audiences. In their first publication, they wrote that Guards made their own 
decisions about how to run the prison and that their aggression was “emitted simply as a 
‘natural’ consequence of being in the uniform of a ‘Guard’ and asserting the power inherent 
in that role” (Haney et al., 1973a, p.12). Later on, in a summary chapter, Zimbardo argued 
that “each subject’s prior societal learning of the meaning of prisons and the behavioural 
scripts associated with the oppositional roles of prisoner and Guard was the sole source of 
guidance” (2004, p.39). More recently still, in their textbook, Zimbardo, Johnson and 
McCann claim that “the mere fact of putting on uniforms was sufficient to transform 
[participants] into passive prisoners and aggressive guards” (2012). This point has now 
become canonical in the field in seeming to show that toxic situations are sufficient to 
stimulate toxic behaviour.
Whatever the precise wording, the core of Zimbardo and colleagues’ argument is that 
what the Guards did they did “without training from [the Experimenters] in how to be 
Guards” (Zimbardo, Banks Haney, & Jaffe, 1973, p.40; see also Zimbardo, Banks Haney, & 
Jaffe, 1974, pp.65-66). In the researchers’ words “our results go one step further [than 
Milgram’s] in removing the immediate presence of the dominant experimenter-authority 
figure, [and] giving the subjects-as-guards a freer range of behavioural alternatives” (Haney 
et al., 1973b, p.90). Indeed, it is the fact that the study points to the power of social roles on 
their own to engender cruelty that has helped make the SPE so influential in the scientific 
literature. The implication is that good people will generally turn bad if they happen to be put 
in a powerful position in a toxic place.  
This is the lesson which Zimbardo himself has explicitly drawn from the SPE, naming
it The Lucifer Effect — the title of his best-selling 2007 book. It is a lesson that has been 
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widely propagated, not only in psychology but also to students and researchers in a wide 
array of other disciplines (e.g., history and criminology; Browning, 1992; Jacoby, Severance, 
& Bruce, 2004). Indeed, alongside Milgram’s (1963, 1974) classic research on Obedience to 
Authority (OtA), the SPE may have had more impact on the public consciousness than any 
other piece of psychological research (Banyard, 2007; Blum, 2018; Konnikova, 2015).
Problems with the role account
Over the five decades since it was conducted, the SPE has been subjected to 
increasing scrutiny and criticism (Griggs 2014; Turner, 2006). Although textbook and 
popular accounts of the study generally make little or no mention of limitations in either the 
study’s design or Zimbardo and colleagues’ interpretation of its findings (Bartels et al., 2016; 
Carnahan & McFarland, 2007; Griggs 2014; Griggs & Whitehead, 2014), there are two 
principal lines of criticism in the scientific literature. 
First, from the sources that are available — notably Zimbardo’s, 1992, film of the 
study, Quiet Rage, and his 2007 book (though, as Griggs, 2014, points out, these fail to 
include many important details of the study) — it is clear that many participants did not 
conform to role. Many Prisoners continued to resist authority until the end of the study (Le 
Texier, 2018; Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Likewise, many Guards refused to assert their 
authority. While a few were brutal and cruel, others were not, and some even sided with the 
Prisoners (Zimbardo, 1992). Such variability requires a more nuanced interpretation of the 
SPE than is typically provided in media and textbook reports (Haslam & Reicher, 2007). For 
many participants, then, it appears that being given a role was not sufficient to elicit the type 
of behaviour for which the study has become well known.
Second, to the extent that some Guards and some Prisoners did conform, there are 
suggestions that, rather than doing so of their own accord, the actions of the Experimenters 
may have played an important part in producing their behaviour. Early on, Banuazizi and 
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Movahedi (1975; see also Gray, 2013) noted that the behaviour of participants — especially 
the Guards — could be explained in terms a range of salient demand characteristics that 
encouraged them to behave in particular ways. The importance of the Experimenters’ actions 
was subsequently demonstrated in a study by Lovibond, Milthiran and Adams (1979) in 
which Guards were instructed to adopt either authoritarian, democratic, or participatory 
approaches to their role. Here only the authoritarian instructions produced toxic behaviour 
similar to that seen in the SPE. Moreover, in a more recent prison study by Reicher and 
Haslam (2006) Guards were given no direct instructions about how to behave (other than 
prohibiting violence, as in the SPE) and subsequently showed no inclination to treat Prisoners
cruelly. 
This body of research led Haslam and Reicher (2007, 2012b) to propose that the 
Experimenters’ leadership may have been critical to the emergence of Guard cruelty in the 
SPE. There is some evidence to support this in the materials Zimbardo has previously made 
available, notably the briefing which he gave to the Guards during the ‘orientation day’ 
before the Prisoners arrived. This is included in the 1992 film of the SPE.  During the 
briefing Zimbardo announced: You can create in the prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense 
of fear to some degree, you can create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is totally 
controlled by us, by the system, you, me – and they’ll have no privacy. They’ll have no 
freedom of action, they can do nothing, say nothing that we don’t permit. We’re going to take
away their individuality in various ways. In general what all this leads to is a sense of 
powerlessness.
Two features of this passage are notable. The first is Zimbardo’s use of the terms ‘we’
‘us’ ‘they’ and ‘their’. In effect, he positions himself as part of the Guard’s ingroup, standing 
with them against the Prisoners (for evidence of the power of such rhetoric, see Donnellon, 
1996; Steffens & Haslam, 2013). As he said in an interview in 1972 “I trained the guards 
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and said ‘Look, this is a serious situation, we’re in this together and it’s you and I and us 
and the people of California versus the prisoners’” (cited in Le Texier, 2018). In short, he 
created a sense of multiple overlapping identities which defined the Experimenters and 
Guards together (as people interested in science, as reformers, and as good Americans) as a 
united force against the Prisoners. The second feature is the explicit guidance that Guards are 
given about the general manner in which they should act — being instructed to create a sense 
of fear and boredom, to remove the Prisoners privacy and freedom, and so on. 
In short, then, this briefing can be seen as an act of leadership on the part of 
Zimbardo. And although this point has never been acknowledged either by Zimbardo and his 
colleagues (e.g., Zimbardo, 1999, 2004, 2006) or in textbooks that describe the SPE (see 
Griggs, 2014), it raises the question of whether there were further acts of leadership during 
the study, something suggested by a number of the people who were directly involved in the 
study  (Eshelman, cited in Ronson, 2015; Mark, 2007) and also by other scholars 
(Konnikova, 2015; Le Texier, 2018). It also raises the question of how important the 
leadership of the Experimenters might have been in producing the cruelty of the Guards.
Yet, interesting as these questions are, neither could ever be answered as long as the 
only clear evidence of leadership was the single passage cited above. Certainly, this provides 
a thin basis on which to argue that the Experimenters’ interventions were crucial to producing
Guard cruelty, let alone to develop an alternative theoretical account of both parties’ 
behaviour. We may have suspected that leadership was important in producing toxic 
behaviour, but for substantive data to support this analysis we have previously had to look 
elsewhere for evidence.
An alternative account: Identity leadership and engaged followership
Elaborating on the foregoing observations, Haslam and Reicher (2007a, 2012b) 
suggest that what may have been going on in the SPE is a specific process referred to as 
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identity leadership. This analysis is grounded in hypotheses derived from social identity 
theorizing (after Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) 
This analysis emerges from a tradition of social identity research (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
which proposes that human beings have the capacity to define themselves not only as individuals 
(e.g., “Abigail”, “Barbara”, “Colin”) but as group members (e.g., “Americans”. “Buddhists”, “Cubs 
fans”) and that the way we define ourselves is bound up with social context. In particular, following 
Bruner (1958), we adopt a given group membership to the extent that it allows us to make sense of 
our role in the situation that confronts us (i.e., so that it is fitting; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). 
For this reason, Reicher & Haslam (1996) argue that people do not automatically take on roles (in 
ways that Zimbardo et al., 1973b suggest), but do so only to the extent that these roles make sense —
or, rather, have been made to make sense — in the context of a salient social identity.
Once we do self-categorize ourselves and others in collective terms (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994) we perceive and evaluate
ourselves, our world, and our goals in terms of the social group. Thus it is the esteem in which the 
group is held that defines our self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and indeed when the group is 
defined positively and is a source of pride, we are more likely to identify with it (Tyler & Blader, 
2003). Equally, it is the interest of the group which defines our self-interest such that we may  
sacrifice our personal gain or even our personal existence for the collective cause (Swann et al., 
2014).
 Perhaps most importantly, it is the understanding of the group (its collective beliefs, values 
and norms) which guide us in pursuing this interest (Reicher, Haslam & Spears, 2012; Turner & 
Reynolds, 2011). The significance of this is that it provides the basis for a model of social influence 
termed referent informational influence (Turner, 1982, 1991). According to this, when group identity
becomes salient, individuals seek to ascertain and to conform to those understandings which define 
what it means to be a member of the relevant group. This then provides distinctive answers to the 
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three key questions for any model of influence. Who is influential? Those in a position to know the 
group beliefs, values and norms by virtue of their being representative of the group (formally, after 
Rosch, 1978, those who are prototypical of the group). Who is influenced? Those who share a 
common salient social identity. What achieves influence? Messages seen to be consonant with group 
understandings. 
This model of influence is also an implicit theory of leadership. For effective leaders can be 
understood as those who are able (a) to represent themselves as prototypical of the group, (b) to 
make potential followers represent themselves as members of a common social group, and (c) to 
represent their proposals as the actualisation of group understandings. Put slightly differently, leaders
are able to influence followers largely as a function of their capacity to represent create and advance 
a sense of social identity that they share with those followers (a sense of ‘us-ness’). As we have put it
elsewhere, effective leadership is therefore a process of social identity management (Haslam, 
Reicher & Platow, 2011).
Over the last 20 years this model of leadership has been made explicit, elaborated and tested 
by a range of authors (Hogg, 2001; Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins, 2005; Steffens et al., 2014; van 
Dick et al., 2018; Turner & Haslam, 2001). In our own work, we provide an analysis that centres on 
four core insights (Haslam et al., 2011; Reicher et al., 2005). The first is that effective leaders (those 
who influence and harness the energies of followers) need to be seen to be representative of a shared
ingroup. However, it is not enough just to be prototypical of the group. Many leaders who are 
ingroup members and who understand group norms and values may nonetheless act for their own 
ends rather than the group’s. Indeed, in contemporary politics this belief is central to the rise of 
populist ‘anti-politics’ (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). Accordingly, second, effective leaders need to 
be seen to be advancing ingroup interests. But what the group and its interests are is never just given.
For this reason, third, leaders, need to be entrepreneurs of identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000) who 
actively construe followers as part of a common group (Reicher et al., 2005) and actively construe 
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themselves as both prototypical and working for the group (Haslam et al., 2011). Additionally, they 
need to present their own messages and projects as an actualization of group beliefs values and 
norms. This brings us to the fourth and final point: that because leadership is not just about how 
leaders act but also about their capacity to shape the actions of followers, effective leaders need to be
impresarios of identity who promote policies and practices that help translate group values into 
material lived reality. 
Support for these four propositions is provided by a large body of research in social, 
organizational and political psychology (Haslam et al., 2011; Steffens et al., 2014). For example,  
recent meta-analysis has found that leaders garner more support, exert more influence, and are seen 
as more charismatic the more prototypical they are of the group they lead (Barreto & Hogg, 2018, 35
studies, r=.49; Steffens et al., 2018, 70 studies, r=.39). Moreover, a recent study conducted across 21
countries shows that the above four aspects of identity leadership predict leader success better than 
many other theoretical constructs (notably transformational leadership and authentic leadership; van 
Dick et al., 2018). Principles of identity leadership thus appear to characterize and underpin effective
leadership across a wide range of leaders, groups and social contexts. 
But can principles of identity leadership help us better understand the culture of 
cruelty that emerged in the SPE? Haslam and Reicher (2007, 2012) argued that they might 
but, as noted above, the lack of relevant detail made this question hard to answer definitively.
To test their ideas Haslam and Reicher therefore turned to other classic studies in which 
ordinary people were led to be cruel to others, notably Milgram’s (1963, 1974) classic studies
of ‘Obedience to Authority’ (OtA). On inspection, there are a number of aspects of these 
studies that were consistent with an identity leadership account. In the first instance, archival 
material provided clear evidence of the considerable lengths that Milgram went to in order to 
encourage participants to identify with his research enterprise and to see its goals 
— ostensibly to improve scientific understanding of the effects of punishment on learning 
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— as positive, worthy and a source of pride (Gibson, 2013; Haslam, Reicher, Millard & 
MacDonald, 2015; Russell, 2011). This identity entrepreneurship, in turn, appears to have 
underpinned participants’ willingness to harm the Learner within the OtA paradigm. In 
particular, correlational and experimental research shows that in both the original Milgram 
studies and in more recent conceptual replications, participants prove willing to follow 
destructive instructions only to the extent that they identify with the (male) Experimenter and 
the scientific community that he represents (Haslam, Reicher & Birney, 2014; Reicher et al. 
2012). Indeed, Haslam and Reicher argue — and have shown experimentally (e.g., Haslam et
al., 2014, 2015) — that the power of situational cues within the paradigm derives precisely 
from their capacity to encourage identification with the Experimenter and his scientific 
agenda (e.g., so that participants identify more with the Experimenter when he is in the same 
room or from a prestigious institution, or when he states that the Experiment requires that 
they continue, rather than ordering to them to go on).  
As well as validating an identity leadership analysis of toxic behaviour, these studies 
also point to some distinctive aspects of leadership as it applies to the cultivation of cruelty. 
The key issue is that, as we now know from the SPE and the BBC Prison Study (Reicher & 
Haslam, 2006), few people spontaneously identify with roles that require them to be cruel to 
others. Hence, as Haslam and Reicher (2006, 2012, 2017) have argued, those who advocate 
harming others need to work hard to do the identity entrepreneurship necessary (a) to get 
others to identify with them and their group cause, (b) to construe the group’s goals as noble, 
virtuous and a source of pride, and (c) to show how harmful acts are absolutely necessary for 
the achievement of those goals.
In the case of the OtA studies, archival research makes it clear that Milgram indeed 
worked hard to do precisely this (e.g., Haslam et al., 2014; Russell, 2001). Yet in the case of 
the SPE, Zimbardo and colleagues’ public statements argued directly against the identity 
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leadership analysis, and, as we have seen, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary 
their role account has continued to serve as the dominant explanation in textbooks, movies, 
and the media.
New evidence from the SPE
In 2018, the situation described above regarding the lack of evidence from SPE 
changed. The Zimbardo archive at Stanford University became available online and was 
subjected to forensic examination by Le Texier (2018). This has allowed many of the 
previous gaps in knowledge about what happened in the study to be filled in. Of particular 
relevance to the present argument, the archive presents a much richer picture of how the 
Experimenters directly engaged with participants in the study. As a consequence, we are now 
in a position rigorously to examine whether an identity leadership analysis can explain what 
happened in the SPE. 
There are at least four new pieces of evidence provided by Le Texier (2018) which 
point to the importance of the Experimenters’ leadership in the SPE in producing the cruelty 
of the Guards as well as other related outcomes:
First, following Zimbardo’s orientation day briefing, the Guards had a much longer 
session with the ‘Chief Warden’ David Jaffe.  As Le Texier (2018, p.74) notes, this lasted 5-6
hours but only a portion was recorded. In a key passage, Warden Jaffe told them:
I guess when you come into prison you have to sit and wait and wait and wait and so 
we’ll have that, the waiting with the uniforms, stocking cap and all this business. The 
idea is to order them around, you don’t request them to do anything, you tell them, and I 
think that all of you could probably put on some sort of a firm policemenlike voice. I 
don’t know but we’ll probably try to role play that a little bit this afternoon.  … If we 
don’t do anything, then we’re just playing a game, and nothing happens — we don’t 
learn anything. So your inventiveness and whatever else — stick-to-it-ness as far as 
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devising things, working out a schedule, and then rewards and punishments and all of 
this kind of thing are very important part of making the thing run. To a large extent we 
will either create this prison environment or not on the basis of what you do during the 
shift (cited in Le Texier, 2018, pp. 80-81)
The important thing to note here is that this briefing does not merely reiterate Zimbardo’s 
general guidelines to the Guards, but provides very detailed instructions about to how to act. 
When one of the Guards expressed concerns that “some of these sadisms” might create “some
kind of bad problems” Jaffe gives further practical advice on what should be done if the 
damage to the prisoners requires medical attention: “We have access to the Cowell Health 
Center Facilities … and should we have need for that sort of thing, we can get them over 
[t]here very fast”. This does two things: it implies that the level of abuse might rise to a level 
that requires medical attention, while simultaneously signalling that this should not be seen as
a problem. Moreover, in line with principles of identity leadership, Jaffe stresses that these 
actions are necessary for the research team to achieve its important goals, and with his 
repeated references to ‘we’, he makes it clear that he sees the Guards as part of that team.
Second, it is clear that such detailed instructions were not limited to orientation 
sessions but continued to the end of the study. One of the Guards, Mike Varn, noted in his 
post-study evaluation that “the Warden or Prof. Zimbardo specifically directed me (us) to act
a certain way (ex. hard attitude Wednesday following Tuesday leniency)” (cited in Le Texier,
in press). In a similar vein, when writing to Zimbardo after the study had ended, another 
Guard, Andre Cerovina described how Jaffe told them to do such things as stand outside the 
cells in the middle of the night and blow their whistles. He concludes: “I thought that the 
Warden was very creative, not just then but through the experiment, he gave us very good 
sado-creative ideas.” (cited in Le Texier, in press). Another Guard, Dave Eshelman, gleaned 
the Experimenters’ expectations not only from what he was told to do, but also from what he 
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was not discouraged from doing: “We would ramp up the general harassment, just sort of 
crank it up a bit. Nobody was telling me I shouldn't be doing this. The professor is the 
authority here, you know. He’s the prison warden. He’s not stopping me.” (cited in Le 
Texier, 2018, p.81). In this way, multiple guards independently reported direct, concrete 
instruction from the Experimenters about how to torment the prisoners.
Third, the Guards were aware of what they were expected, or indeed required, to do to
ensure the goals of the Experimenters were achieved. One, Terry Barnett, wrote: “I 
consciously felt that for the experiment to be at all useful ‘guards’ had to act something like 
guards. […] I felt that the experiment was important and my being ‘guard-like’ was part of 
finding out how people react to real oppression” (cited in Le Texier, in press). Again this 
speaks to the ways in which the Experimenters’ identity leadership ensured that Guards saw 
their cruelty as necessary for the advancement of a worthy ingroup cause. 
Echoing Eshelman’s statement that “it’s the Professor who decides here”, another 
(unidentified) Guard said to Zimbardo and his colleagues during the debriefing that “You’re 
the Experimenter and in a sense we’re kind of like the employees” (cited in Le Texier, in 
press). Yet, by the same token, another Guard who was unconvinced of the study’s worth, 
dropped out because of the requirement to act harshly: “I object to the way prisoners will be 
treated. As the orientation meeting went on, the way things were stressed, there will be too 
much harassment.” (cited in Le Texier, 2018, p. 105). All Guards thus inferred that the 
Experimenters were keen to encourage harassment and cruelty. Moreover, the fact that this 
assumption extended to a Guard who did not behave this ways, suggests this is not simply a 
post hoc rationalization or a strategy for shifting blame. 
Fourth, there is evidence that the Experimenters shaped not only the Guards’ 
understandings but also the way they structured the prison regime. While the traditional 
account of the SPE suggests that the Guards drew up the prison rules and regulations 
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themselves, the new information suggests that they were effectively dictated by Warden 
Jaffe’s orientation session. Of the 17 rules in the SPE, 11 were copies of those which Jaffe 
had drawn up for an earlier prison study of his own and the other 6 were largely adaptations 
to the specific circumstances of the SPE (e.g., a rule forbidding playing with the light 
switches because there were no such switches in Jaffe’s study; see Le Texier, 2018, p.61; in 
press). Likewise, many of the punishments were based on those which had been devised in 
Jaffe’s earlier study. It is not plausible that these similarities are mere coincidence.
In combination, these various pieces of evidence show clearly that the level of 
intervention by the Experimenters in the SPE was greater than has been reported in the 
literature or media. More importantly, it is apparent that these explicit and implicit 
instructions had more of an impact on the Guards than has been previously acknowledged. In 
the light of this, it is very difficult to sustain Zimbardo and colleagues’ claim that Guards 
acted cruelly entirely of their own accord or slipped naturally into cruel roles.
We can therefore now say with confidence that leadership is important to an 
understanding of cruelty in the SPE. Nevertheless, while there are suggestions that this took 
the specific form of identity leadership — for instance, in Guards’ statements that they felt 
that they were acting in pursuit of a worthwhile cause — the evidence we have presented thus
far is hardly definitive.  Not least, this is because the material discussed above does not 
provide an opportunity for in-depth analysis of the Experimenters’ leadership in action. 
There is, however, one further piece of evidence in the archive which is particularly 
pertinent to this issue. This is the recording of a formal meeting early in the SPE between 
Prison Warden Jaffe, and a Guard, John Mark. Two features of this meeting make it 
particularly relevant to the key question of how the Experimenters sought to produce Guard 
toxicity. The first is that Mark had been reluctant to act repressively (as he confirmed to us in 
a telephone interview on June 13th 2018) and so the whole meeting centered on Jaffe trying to
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get him to adopt the role of a tough Guard. The second is that a recording of the entire 
interchange is available (whereas this is true of less than 10% of the entire study; Le Texier, 
in press) and therefore can be analysed in its entirety. The recording is held in the Department
of Special Collections and University Archives in Stanford University Libraries (Source ID: 
SC0750_s5_b2_21). It can be accessed directly online at 
http://purl.stanford.edu/wn708sg0050 and a full transcript is provided in the Supplementary 
Materials. This allows students and researchers to review the transcript themselves and 
determine the degree to which it supports our identity leadership analysis rather than 
Zimbardo’s role account.1
This interview provides a new and unprecedented opportunity to investigate a series 
of questions concerning not just the degree of leadership in the SPE but also the form taken 
by such leadership. To start with, did Warden Jaffe accept the position taken by Mark, or did 
he actively attempt to change Mark’s stance? That is, to paraphrase Zimbardo’s (2004, p.39) 
outline of the role conformity account, did Jaffe encourage the Guard to “rely on his own 
prior societal learning of the meaning of prisons and the behavioural scripts associated with 
the oppositional roles of prisoner and Guard as [his] sole source of guidance”? Or did he 
instead employ the signature characteristics of the identity leadership account?
More formally, we can break the identity leadership account down into the three 
elements that we outlined above and then gauge the presence of each of them in the text. The 
first involves seeking to establish a common cause and a common group membership that 
1  Before reading our own analysis of these issues, we recommend that readers listen to the 
interview and read the transcript for themselves. Given the necessity of applying open 
science principles to what has previously been a closed debate, we think it important that 
readers judge independently how the original materials speak to the respective merits of 
different conceptual accounts of the toxic behavior that unfolded in the SPE and evaluate 
for themselves the adequacy of our identity leadership account. For reasons of openness 
and transparency, we also illustrate our points with verbatim extracts from the meeting 
accompanied with line numbers related to the meeting transcript in the Appendix. This 
allows readers to check that our use of these extracts is accurate and appropriate.
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links the Experimenters and Guards. The second involves presenting ‘tough’ or cruel 
behaviour as necessary in order to advance this shared cause. The third involves 
characterizing the group cause as worthy and noble in order to justify the toxic behaviour that
advances it. If these elements are present, this would provide strong novel evidence that 
identity leadership had a role to play in efforts to encourage the Guards to behave cruelly.
The Jaffe-Mark meeting
On leadership
Warden Jaffe’s meeting with Guard Mark is replete with evidence that the Guard was 
not conforming (blindly or otherwise) to the role he had been assigned and that, rather than 
simply accept this, Warden Jaffe sought to get him to change his mind. Faced with the 
Guard’s admission that “I’m not too tough” [line 14] and that “if it was just entirely up to 
me, I wouldn’t do anything. I would just let it cool off” [line 38], the Warden makes it clear at
multiple points in the meeting that the Experimenters expect (and require) him both to be 
more “involved” [lines 12, 80] in proceedings and to be more “tough” [lines 13, 17, 244].
Indeed, the meeting starts with (and was presumably motivated by) the observation that:
We noticed this morning that you weren’t really lending a hand … but we really want to 
get you active and involved because the Guards have to know that every Guard is going
to be what we call a tough Guard. [lines 1-2, 11-13] 
In urging the Guard to be more tough, it is also apparent that the Warden 
contextualizes this toughness as an aspect of the role that the Guard is being asked to play in 
order to ensure the experiment is a success. That is, toughness is not valorised as a positive 
attribute in and of itself. Rather, it is valorised as an important dimension of an identity that 
the Warden wants the Guard to adopt. Importantly too, the Warden emphasizes that “every 
Guard” is going to play this same role — underscoring the Experimenters’ expectations 
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about the norms for the entire group and mirroring what both Jaffe himself and Banks had 
said when briefing the Guards as a whole.
Again, though, Mark is reluctant to take on this identity and the attributes associated 
with it. Far from passively or naturally adopting the role of tough Guard, he actively and 
repeatedly resists the pressure from the Warden. This is the exact opposite of what the role 
account would predict. In the face of this resistance, Warden Jaffe repeats and intensifies his 
demands for conformity: 
We’d like you to try a little bit more, to get into the action … instead of sitting in the 
background, if you can get in and start doing something yourself, get involved. [lines 
77-80]… It’s your job to make sure these things [episodes of Prisoner revolt] don’t 
happen, to the best of your ability. [lines 171-172]
Finally, towards the end of the meeting when the Guard is still showing no 
willingness to fall into line, the Warden urges him to “forget some of the more sophisticated 
psychology that you might know” [lines 245-246], to forgo his “individual style” [line 253], 
and instead to embrace the role of “the stereotype Guard” [line 252]. In this way, the Warden
emphasizes the importance of the group and encourages the Guard to self-categorize, and 
behave, as a member of the group. Importantly, rather than allowing the Guard to define the 
role for himself, the Warden defines it for him, and does so in explicitly stereotypic terms. 
Here again, though, the Guard resists by refusing to embrace the categorical ‘us–them’ 
identity that the Warden invokes to structure his understanding of the situation. Indeed, the 
Guard actively contests the stereotypic self-definition that the Warden proposes. Well I’ve 
met a lot of police that, er, that act a whole lot of different ways. You can’t do it just by the 
movies or something. ‘Cause you know I’ve met plenty of police. [lines 248-250]. Far from 
naturally adopting the role or accepting the stereotypic role, the Guard thus makes an explicit 
case for rejecting them. It is thus with more than a hint of exasperation that the Warden 
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concludes the meeting with explicit and concrete instructions about the behaviour expected of
the Guard: When there’s a situation… [you have] to have to go in there and shout if 
necessary. To be more into the action [line 257-258]. 
In sum, two conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. First, the Guard is certainly
not left to his own devices in deciding what to do within the prison. Indeed, he is assertively 
pressured by the prison leadership to conform to group-based expectations. Second, any 
theoretical analysis of Guard behaviour must include the active interventions of the 
Experimenters in seeking to ensure conformity to a brutal role. In short, there clearly is 
sustained leadership going on. We now focus on the forms that this takes with a view to 
understanding the strategies through which the Warden sought to shape the Guard’s behavior.
On identity leadership
The transcript of the meeting between Jaffe and Mark provides striking evidence that 
the Warden encouraged the Guard to discard his personal identity, to adopt a collective 
identity, and to embody stereotypic expectations associated with that collective identity. In 
this respect, as with Zimbardo’s briefing of the Guards that we discussed earlier, one of the 
more striking features of Warden Jaffe’s discourse is his repeated reference to the collective 
“we”. Indeed, the Warden uses the first-person plural pronouns “we”, “our” and “us” 57 
times in this single meeting, or once every 30 words. Previous research has found that this 
use of collective pronouns is associated with effective leadership. For example, across the 34 
Australian elections that have been held since Federation in 1901 winning candidates use 
these collective pronouns once every 79 words while losing candidates use them once every 
136 words (Steffens & Haslam, 2013). Thus while politicians are often seen to exemplify 
principles of identity leadership (e.g., Augoustinos & De Garis, 2012; Gleibs, Hendricks, & 
Kurz, 2018; Reicher & Hopkins, 2000), the Warden appears to enact this aspect of the 
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process of cultivating a sense of shared identity more vigorously than even the most 
successful political leaders. 
In this regard, it is clear that the Guard is encouraged to see himself, along with the 
Experimenter, as part of this collective ‘we’ (i.e., ‘us the prison authorities’). In particular, the
Warden highlights their shared disdain for the correctional system, for example, by stressing 
that “We happen to agree with you that basically it’s rotten” [lines 200-201]. He also 
repeatedly portrays the Guard and the Experimenters as having the same interests and goals: 
These things [prisons and mental hospitals] are all over the place. And we want to know 
about them [lines 83-85]. In this way, the Warden appeals to a shared goal outside the 
experiment in order to justify cruelty within it.
Throughout the interaction the Warden thus goes to great lengths to represent the 
Guard and the Experimenters as being ‘on the same side’ while also sharing common 
enemies — notably those who defend the prevailing criminal justice system and “the pigs” 
[line 246]. He also encourages the Guard to acknowledge and embrace their shared identity 
and at one point accomplishes this through a four-step rhetorical manoeuvre where, first, he 
states his own values; second, he states those of the group as a whole; third, he makes a 
statement about what he sees the Guard’s values to be; and, fourth, he asks the Guard to 
confirm their alignment: I’m very deeply committed to that [rehabilitation]. And I think all of 
us are.… I think you feel the same way. Is that true? [lines 204-209]  In line with identity 
leadership, the construction of shared identity based on a common cause can thus be seen to 
lie at the core of the Warden’s intervention to shape the Guard’s behaviour. 
The Warden also tries to convince Mark that what he is asking him to do — that is, be
tough — is essential to the success of their mutual cause. More specifically, in the face of the 
Guard’s refusal to act tough, the Warden repeatedly reminds him that in doing so he is 
putting the research enterprise as a whole at risk. Guard toughness, the Warden explains, is 
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“really important for the workings of the Experiment” [lines 19-20] since “whether or not 
we can make this thing seem like a prison, which is the aim of the thing, depends largely on 
the Guards’ behaviour” [lines 22-24]. This is a point that the Warden underlines towards the 
end of the meeting when he notes: 
I think you could be a better guard. Er, better in the sense of, you know, the Guards have 
more responsibility at this point for making the thing work. That’s, that’s the real 
clincher right here. That, er, that if the Guards fall apart, the experiment falls apart. 
The Prisoners don’t have that power in this study.  [lines 157-158]. 
In making these observations, Warden Jaffe attunes Guard Mark to two interrelated 
considerations. First, that while it may be unpleasant and not what the Guard would otherwise
want to do, his willingness to be tough is essential for the success of the project. Second, that 
if he fails to rise to this challenge, the Guard is effectively letting the team down. The dual 
implication, then, is that the Guard’s reluctance to conform is not only jeopardizing the 
group’s collective mission but also selfish. At the same time, tough behaviour is framed as 
something that is not only essential to the advancement of shared group goals but also 
expected of any committed group member.
The Warden repeatedly points out that the experiment will fail if the Guards are not 
sufficiently tough and he repeatedly underscores — and asks the Guard to recognize — the 
profound and progressive significance of the experiment for both science and society. Thus 
he asks “Do you understand the rationale behind doing something like this? The importance 
of it?” [lines 186-187]. He then explains in detail how the design of the study will allow the 
researchers to make important scientific claims, because: “There isn’t any prison in this 
country is going to let you set up, you know, observational measures 24 hours a day. So 
that’s why we have to do it here.” [lines 56-58]. He further explains how important the study 
is in terms of societal impact: “hopefully what will come out of this study is some very 
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serious recommendations for reform, at least reform, if not, you know, revolutionary-type 
reform.” [lines 49-53]. In this way, rather than being pernicious, cruelty is represented as an 
essential driver of social progress.
Critically, this impact is also characterised as a social good with reference to the 
progressive identity that the Warden and Guard ostensibly share. This aligns the Guard with 
the shared long-term goals of the research. At the same time, the Warden makes it clear that 
the worthy goal of exposing penal pathology and facilitating penal reform can only be 
achieved through cruel behaviour on the part of the Guard: “What we want to do is be able to
study the thing that exists, or as nearly as we can make it to what exists and to be able to go 
to the world with what we’ve done and say “Now look, this is what happens when you have 
Guards who behave this way” … But in order to say that we have to have Guards who 
behave that way” [lines 211-215]. In setting out the case for Guard cruelty in this way, the 
Warden also explicitly rejects the suggestion that such behaviour might reflect the fact that 
Guards are naturally cruel: “We’re not trying to do this just because we’re sadists” [lines 53-
54]. Indeed, the worthiness of the cause is used as an explicit defence against such an 
accusation:
 If you need an excuse, and I think most of us do really, it is so we can learn what 
happens in a total institution … And we want to know about them. So that we can, we 
can get on the media and, um, and, and into press with it. And, and, and say “Now look
at what, what this really about”. [lines 80-86].
Overall, then, the arguments of the Warden serve to validate cruelty in the study in the
name of challenging cruelty in society — only if the Guards are toxic can toxicity be exposed
and eliminated. What would otherwise be seen as wicked behavior is thereby recast as worthy
action performed in the service of a greater good. This helps assign positive and distinct value
to the ingroup, and it also facilitates identification with that ingroup. It also makes oppression
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of the Prisoners consonant with group norms and serves to offset — and inoculate against — 
any doubts or hesitations that the Guard might have about acting brutally. In short, this new 
evidence displays all the hallmarks of identity leadership.
The need to rethink the nature of cruelty in the SPE
The meeting between Warden and Guard provides clear evidence that Guards in the 
SPE were not left to their own devices when it came to making decisions about how to 
behave and run the prison. On the contrary, they were subjected to active leadership from the 
Experimenters. It follows that any account of the SPE which fails to highlight the leadership 
of the Experimenters and their concerted attempts to make the Guards act in role is both 
partial and misleading. 
As noted above, numerous Guards independently reported that they believed the 
Experimenters played an active role in guiding their behaviour. Beyond this, though, it is 
apparent from various pieces of evidence — notably the transcript of the Jaffe-Mark 
interview and Jaffe’s five-hour briefing of all the Guards — that this leadership took a very 
specific form. In particular, we see that Jaffe’s efforts to encourage the Guard to conform to 
stereotypic role requirements centred on strategies of identity leadership. That is, he sought to
influence Mark through appeals to a sense of shared identity which promoted ‘toughness’ as 
an ingroup-defining attribute necessary (a) to run the prison properly, (b) to advance science, 
and thereby (c) to achieve the valued goal of exposing the toxicity of the American penal 
system. Indeed, by aligning ‘toughness’ with the goals of multiple identities the Warden can 
be seen to have increased the likelihood of it being seen as an appropriate way to behave (in 
ways suggested by identity complexity theory; Roccas & Brewer (2002). 
It should be stressed that these identity appeals were not just a subset of themes that 
are mingled in with others in the meeting. Instead, the meeting can be seen as one long series 
of identity appeals. Time and again Mark insists on his unsuitability as a Guard and his 
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unwillingness to be tough. Time and again Jaffe responds by explaining how important it is 
that he act like a tough Guard to help Jaffe, Zimbardo and others in their noble enterprise. 
Remove this interplay between Mark’s role rejection and Jaffe’s identity entrepreneurship 
and little would be left.
To summarize, then, the new evidence from the SPE archive sustains three theoretical
claims. First, the traditional notion that Guards became cruel of their own accord is very hard 
(if not impossible) to sustain. Second, the Experimenters’ leadership was a central feature of 
the study. Third, and more specifically, we see that the Experimenters engaged in identity 
leadership in an effort to encourage Guard cruelty. Although support for these conclusions 
emerges from the Guard’s reports and the Jaffe-Mark transcript, it is also supported by a 
wealth of other new material (see Le Texier, 2018). In particular, full transcripts of the Guard
briefings indicate that the Experimenters went to considerable trouble to create a sense of 
shared identity with all Guards (not just one), to persuade them that they were co-producers 
of important scientific knowledge, and to indicate in some detail exactly how they were 
expected to behave. What happened to Mark was thus not exceptional, but simply reflects the
fact that he was failing to behave in ways expected (and demanded) by the Experimenters.   
At the same time that we make these claims, it is important to be clear about what we 
are not claiming. First, we do not suggest that identity leadership always produces consent or 
that it did so in the case of Guard Mark. Nevertheless, the efforts of Warden Jaffe did have 
some effect on him. In particular, this is because Mark recollects being fully aware that his 
behaviour was at odds with the Experimenters’ goals and that toughness was presented, and 
affirmed, by the Experimenters as a core norm for the Guard group. He therefore recalls 
being poorly positioned to challenge the cruelty of others — not least because while he 
himself was not cruel in his dealings with the Prisoners, he was sidelined from the shift in 
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which most of the toxic behaviours reported in the SPE took place. Thus, identity leadership 
facilitated Guard cruelty even if Guard Mark did not display this behaviour himself.
Second, even though it is clear that the Experimenters were fairly explicit about 
sanctioning extreme behaviour, and at times provided explicit guidance as to what forms 
these should take, we are not suggesting that the Guards had no autonomy and were simply 
following a script. We agree with Zimbardo and colleagues that the Guards clearly 
improvised and were creative in what they did and how far they went. However, this enriches
rather than undermines the identity leadership analysis. For as Haslam and Reicher (2012) 
have argued, the Guards’ creativity can be seen to reflect the fact that effective identity 
leadership does not produce passive conformity so much as engaged followership. That is, 
when followers identify with a leader and his or her shared cause, they ask themselves what it
is that that leader wants them to do and then strive to interpret the instructions they have been
given enthusiastically and creatively. This is a process that the World War II historian, Ian 
Kershaw refers to as “working towards the Führer” (Kershaw, 1993; see also Sofsky, 1993). 
Here, then, we would suggest that those Guards who were inspired by the identity leadership 
of Zimbardo and his colleagues would have been “working towards the Experimenter”, in 
ways that translated an appeal to be tough into a willingness to be cruel and oppressive 
(Haslam & Reicher, 2007).          
A critical point here is that the identity leadership analysis we have presented — and 
which is represented schematically in Figure 1 — does not simply replace one form of 
automaticity with another (moving from ‘people automatically take on the roles they are 
thrust into’ to ‘people automatically take on the identities that are thrust upon them’). People 
are well able to resist the categories and identities proposed to them (as shown above in 
Mark’s responses to Warden Jaffe), especially if these are at odds with other identities that 
are important in their lives (as shown in our previous critiques of Zimbardo’s work; see 
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Reicher & Haslam, 2006). For this and other reasons, identity leadership may elicit very 
different behaviour from different individuals, and invoking cruelty as a group norm will not 
always lead people to embrace it. This will be especially true if leaders fail — as Warden 
Jaffe did with Guard Mark — to persuade would-be followers that cruelty is a normative 
aspect of an identity that they value.
Can we conclude, then, that even if identity leadership failed to ‘turn’ Mark, it was 
responsible for such Guard cruelty as did occur? Again, to make such a claim is beyond the 
scope of the current evidence. The type of evidence we have from the SPE simply does not 
allow us to make any definitive causal claims of this form. In particular, the small sample and
lack of experimental control mean we cannot be sure that these Guards would not have been 
cruel in any case (e.g., for reasons suggested by Carnahan & McFarland, 2007), or that their 
cruelty was not produced by some other feature of the study besides the leadership of the 
Experimenters. Nevertheless, what we can say with confidence is (a) that the Experimenters 
undoubtedly did try to exercise identity leadership, (b) that several guards independently 
reported being aware of the Experimenter’s efforts to engage in identity leadership, and (c) 
that identity leadership therefore constitutes a plausible framework for explaining Guard 
cruelty in the SPE. At a very minimum, then, the results of our analysis are plainly more 
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consistent with an identity leadership account than they are with the standard role account. 
We would add too that the patterns we have identified above accord with a very large body of
research which shows identity leadership to be a critical component of effective leadership 
(both toxic and benign) in the world at large (e.g., see Steffens et al., 2014; van Dick et al., 
2018).  
In relation to these various points, the significance of the Stanford archive is how 
closely it supports theoretical claims that were first made over a decade ago (but which could 
not be substantiated) — claims which (having now been substantiated) provide an important 
platform for revising our understanding of the important issues that the SPE addresses. In this
regard, it is also clear that there are a great many ways in which the material in the archive 
might not have substantiated our analysis. Most obviously, this would be the case if it had 
revealed no evidence of the Experimenters’ identity leadership or if the behavior of the 
participants had mapped closely on to Zimbardo and colleague’s role account (e.g., if the 
Experimenters had provided the Guards with no guidance about how to interpret their role). 
Indeed, the falsifiability of our analysis is apparent from the fact that, hitherto, Zimbardo  has
dismissed our evidence-based critiques of the SPE as fundamentally wrong-headed and 
“scientifically irresponsible” (2006, p.47).      
Identity leadership and cruelty
The plausibility of our position is enhanced by two further considerations. First, as 
well as being applied to the study of leadership in general (e.g., Haslam et al., 2011; van Dick
et al., 2018), the identity leadership analysis has successfully been used to explain toxic 
behaviour in other classic studies (notably, Milgram’s OtA research). Indeed, once one 
acknowledges the role of leadership in both Milgram’s paradigm and Zimbardo’s, the major 
distinction between the two disappears (Haslam & Reicher, 2012b). Nevertheless, the value 
of this corroboration lies the fact that the OtA studies were more carefully controlled than the 
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SPE, used larger samples, and have been independently replicated (Blass, 2004; Reicher et 
al., 2017). This advances our claim that the identity leadership framework is useful not only 
for understanding behaviour in the SPE, but also for understanding toxic (and non-toxic) 
behaviour in a broad range of experimental contexts.
Second, looking beyond the laboratory to the wider world, it is also clear that identity 
leadership is a common feature in episodes of human toxicity and brutality, perhaps 
especially in its most extreme forms (Koonz, 2003; Muller-Hill, 1988; Sofsky, 1993; 
Vetlesen, 2005). A recurrent observation is that leaders work hard not only to create a 
common identity with would-be perpetrators, but to convince them that cruelty to outgroups 
(e.g., Muslims, migrants, dissidents) is necessary for the protection and advancement of the 
ingroup (e.g., keeping Serbia strong, America great, Turkey safe). However, if we were to 
select just one example to exemplify the dynamics of human inhumanity, we would choose 
Himmler’s infamous Poznan speech of 6th October 1943 in which he rallied SS Officers to 
persevere with the challenges of exterminating Jews in occupied Poland. The substance of 
this is exemplified by the following passage:
It is one of those things that is easily said: ‘The Jewish people is being exterminated’, 
every party member will tell you. . . [But] none of them has seen it happen, not one has 
had to go through with it. Most of you men know what it is like to see 100 corpses lie side
by side, or 500 or 1,000. To have stood fast through all this and. . . at the same time to 
have remained a decent person. . . has made us hard. This is an unwritten and never-to-
be-written page of glory in our history. . .. All in all, however, we can say that we have 
carried out this most difficult of tasks in a spirit of love for our people. (Grobmes & 
Landen, 1983, pp. 454–455; cited by Haslam et al., 2015, p.78) 
By invoking this example we are not suggesting that the toxicity observed in 
Milgram’s studies or in the SPE was in any way comparable with that of the Holocaust 
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(Miller, 2014). What we believe is striking, though, is the consonance in the processes 
through which this was encouraged in these different settings. Framing cruelty as essential for
the achievement of noble collective goals thus appears to be a critical strategy for mobilizing 
people to hate and harm others in theatres of conflict both small and large.
It follows from all this that just as cruelty does not inhere simply in the nature of the 
perpetrators so too it does not inhere only the demands of the situation. An understanding of 
how it is produced additionally requires an analysis of leadership, of how leaders persuade, 
and of how they are able to portray toxic behavior as worthy action in defense of a noble 
group cause. Central to this endeavor are leaders’ efforts to construct a sense of shared 
identity that encompasses both the source and the target of persuasion. Indeed, accounts 
which seek to naturalize cruelty and harm-doing as an inevitable outcome of human behavior 
serve to help leaders avoid accountability for the part they have played and so, not 
surprisingly, are often invoked by repressive leaders in their own defence (Cesarani, 2004). A
case in point involves Radovan Karadzic who was indicted before the International Criminal 
Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for his war crimes. His defence centred on the claim 
that the hatred between groups and the violence that was perpetrated “arose of its own accord,
from the bottom up and cannot be attributed to Franco Trujman” (cited in Elcheroth & 
Reicher, 2017, p. 29).
Conclusion
The new evidence that we have examined in this paper makes it clear that the specific 
narrative of the SPE and our broader understanding of cruelty in the world both need to be 
rewritten. The totality of evidence indicates that far from slipping naturally into their assigned
roles, some of Zimbardo’s Guards actively resisted. They were consequently subjected to 
intense interventions from the Experimenters. These sought to persuade them to conform to 
group norms for the purpose of achieving a shared and admirable group goal. Where 
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previously we only had inklings that the behavior of Guards in the SPE could have been 
produced in response to forces of identity leadership, we now have sufficiently strong and 
clear evidence of this as to need to place it on the scientific record. This in turn means that we
must, of necessity, focus on the role of these forces in spawning cruelty and repression more 
generally, both in our studies and in the world beyond. 
We hope that future presentations of the SPE — whether in the scientific literature, in 
classrooms, or in boardrooms — will now tell a richer story of what happened in the 
basement of the Stanford Psychology Department during the summer of 1971. If that 
happens, then the SPE can continue to help us achieve a richer appreciation of the dark social 
processes which blight the human condition.
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Supplementary material
Transcript of Meeting between Warden Jaffe and Guard Mark 
(Side 2 of Tape 136510: http://purl.stanford.edu/wn708sg0050.)




8.38  Warden: OK. We noticed this morning that um you weren’t really, you 






8.50  Guard: Well this morning it seemed like there was pretty, many guys in 
there anyhow, in the end. I thought that for security it was better if 
not everybody went everywhere at one time together. I was just 







9.11  Warden: Right, but generally, you’ve been kind of in the background. 
Part of that is my fault because I’ve, you know, I’ve kind of gone 
along with when you’ve wanted to sit outside while they were doing 
the count and that sort of thing, but we really want to get you active 
and involved because the Guards have to know that every Guard is 
going to be what we call a tough Guard and so far, um…  
14 9.36  Guard: … I’m not too tough …
15 9.38  Warden: Yeah. Well you have to try to kind of get it in you.





9.45  Warden: See, the thing is what I mean by tough is, you know, you have 
to be, um, firm, and you have to be in the action and, er, and that sort
of thing. Um, it’s really important for the workings of the 
Experiment … 




10.04  Warden:   ... because, um, because, the, you know, whether or not we 
can make this thing seem like a prison, which is the aim of the thing, 





10.20  Guard: Well, I can see that, you know. I can see what it’s doing to the 
experiment. Like all I can do is like think of it in terms of times that 
I’ve had dealings with police, like. And it seems the exact same thing
to me as any time I’ve ever seen the police. And it seems that…




10.44 Guard: I think it’s realistic but I think that what you’re sort of asking me
to do I think is the same reason why I think there is always so much 
trouble with the police. 






10.55 Guard: Because I think whenever there’s something wrong people start 
yelling and they take away more privileges, just that cycle. I think 
that makes it worse. And I think there’s problems. What I would do 
if I was a Guard, if it was just entirely up to me, I wouldn’t do 




11.24 Warden: Ah, at some point that may be necessary. But our purpose here 
is not to devise a better prison. I mean we all know how to do that. 
Right? Um…
42 11.33 Guard: I don’t know. I really don’t know.
43 11.35 Warden: Well no, I don’t mean a better prison, let’s say a better criminal 
38
















justice system. I mean that’s, that’s what my whole class that I was 
teaching last quarter was dealing with. We were talking about 
alternatives, what we could do better. And, the idea is, that this is 
supposed to be, as nearly as we can make it, a copy of the existing 
one. In other words, we want to see what this does to ordinary 
innocent people, and, um, we know it’s not nice, but we don’t know 
how it’s not nice. And that’s what we’re trying to find out. And 
hopefully what will come out of this study is some very serious 
recommendations for reform, at least reform, if not, you know, 
revolutionary-type reform. So this is our goal. We’re not trying to do
this just because we’re all um sadists. Um. You see we want to be 
able to study what a prison is like. And you can’t really do that. I 
mean no prison, there isn’t any prison in this country is going to let 
you set up, you know, observational measures 24 hours a day. So 




12.59 Guard: Well I don’t know about that. Because I just read about a prison 
the other day where, er, the guys wanted to stay in until their time 
was up because, er, you know [inaudible]…
62
63
13.16 Warden: No, but what I said is that there’s no prison that will let us go in
there and observe …







13.18 Warden: … what we want to observe. In other words we can’t go in 
there. We have no way of studying what, what the typical prison is 
like on a thorough basis. So, what we’re doing is, on the basis of 
what we’ve read and heard. You know, and what I mean by studying
is, is studying the effects that it has on people. We’re trying to make 







13.47 Guard:  You know, there’s also the effects that it has on Guards, you 
know. Just, just by wearing this Guard’s uniform, you know, that’s a 
pretty heavy thing for me. I, you know, I don’t really get into this 
stuff too much. So, you know, I, I, I can do the Guard things, extra 
things like getting really tough and yelling and stuff, I don’t know 











14.14 Warden: We’d like you to try a little bit more, to get into the action, you 
know, if there’s something to be done, instead of sitting in the 
background, if you can get in and start doing something yourself, get
involved, um.  And, if you, if you need, if you need an excuse, and I 
think most of us do really, um, it is, you know, so we can, we can 
learn what happens in a total institution, which we’ve set up, and 
which a prison is and a mental hospital is, and these things are all 
over the place. And we want to know about them. So that we can, we
can get on the media and, um, and, and into press with it. And, and, 
and say “Now look at what, what this really about”. 
87 15.02 Guard:  … Yes ...
88
89
15.04 Warden: This is, this is really I think an important thing, but in order to 





15.13 Guard: Well I think, you know, I’ll try. But in a way I was kind of 
unfortunate that when this experiment was set up that it was er 
random picking like that. Because I think, er, you know, its, I, I don’t
think I’m a very good Guard for the experiment, but I could have 
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94 been a really good prisoner.
95
96












15.41 Warden: Alright. Let’s say hypothetically, that… No, well let me start 
over. Let’s say that, um, you have, you want to eventually have two 
groups of people and you’re going to do different operations on each 
group and you want to find out, or you’re going to, you’re going to 
do, you know, one group basically is a control group right and one 
group is an experimental group and we do something on them, 













16.22 Warden: Now, let’s say that the Prisoners in this group are the 
experimental group and the Guards we can kind of call the control 
group, OK? Um, now, if the, so, and then we, then at the end we 
observe the differences between the two groups. … Now if you want
to make sure that the differences are due to the experimental 
manipulation, in other words due to the fact that some people are 
Prisoners in this experiment you have to start out with a group that is
as similar between groups as possible and the best way to get that is 
random selection. In other words, what we’re, what we’re basically 
saying when we say we have random selection is that we took two 
groups of people who were similar and did different things to them, 







17.17 Guard:  OK. But it would seem to me that if you wanted to study an 
experiment that is as closely as possible simulating prison 
experience, like you said, that you wouldn’t want two groups of 
people that were that similar to begin with because in a prison you 




17.37 Warden: Well, there are a lot of people who say that the Guards are 
really, not much different…
126 17.40 Guard:  They are different from Prisoners. 





17.43 Guard:  They’re not like normal people, I’ll say that. But they’re not like
Prisoners because they’re not people that, that would do, do stuff in 
society that would put them in prison, they’re people who would cop





 17.57 Warden:  Alright, let’s make a different analogy. Let’s take a mental 
hospital, which I think is a closer analogy. Most people say that the 
staff in mental hospitals, by and large, are not too dissimilar from the
patients.







18.14 Warden: [Laughs] Right, OK. At any rate, um, I’m not going to hassle 
with you over whether or not they are. All I’m explaining to you is 
why we had random selection. The idea is to, is to get as nearly 
equal, you know the same, er, people in each group to start out with, 
um, so that’s why, and you were randomly selected to be a Guard. 
That’s the way it was.
143 18.43 Guard:  OK.
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144
145










18.53 Guard:  Well, all I can … OK I will try. And like, it’s just like a situation
where if I had randomly assigned to be a Prisoner I think I would 
have done stuff like not eat and I would have been really, really quiet
and just done exercises and things like this. And you know I think 
it’s pretty much an analogous situation. You know it could have been
that that would have been messing up the results that way too. You 
know, if I wasn’t in there and being a real prisoner that was trying to 








19.40 Warden: No. Alright. All I’m trying to do is to point out, er, how I think 
you could be a better guard. Er, better in the sense of, you know, the 
Guards have more responsibility at this point for making the thing 
work. That’s, that’s the real clincher right here. That, er, that if the 
Guards fall apart, the experiment falls apart. The prisoners don’t 
have that power in this study. So, because almost anything they do, 
you know, they can’t …
161 20.22 Guard:  They rip off the doors. And ripped bed …
162 20.25 Warden: No, I don’t think they be able to …
163 20.28 Guard:  One guy just, just broke his door
164 20.30 Warden: Oh yeah?
165
166
20.32 Guard:  And I think, I think that, well, I would be surprised if after two 
weeks they didn’t start ripping up the plastic covers and the beds
167
168
20.40 Warden: Well we’re going to, yeah ... We may move, you know, over to 
the County jail, um, 







20.50 Warden: … and that’ll solve that problem. But we have to continue until,
until ...  You see it’s your job to make sure these things don’t 
happen, to the best of your ability. You have as much responsibility 
for that as any of the other Guards on your shift. You’re not as big 
and you may not be as loud. But you have to, you know, you have to 
try and give it what you’ve got …






21.14 Warden: … and get in there and pitch, and give them a hand because 
there aren’t that many Guards. We’re going to try and get a fourth 
Guard for this shift, ‘cause we think we need it for the time being 
anyway. For today, to help handle. But that doesn’t mean you can 
fade out into the background. Because this is your shift. OK? 
182 21.36 Guard: OK. 
183
184
21.37 Warden: … So let’s try and try and get in there and pitch and we’ll have 
we’ll have some of the other Guards on the shift help you, um…  
185 21.48 Guard: Well, you know, you know.
186
187
21.50 Warden: And, do you…  What I want to add is do you understand, um, 
the rationale behind doing something like this? The importance of it.
188 22.04 Guard: Um. “It” meaning what?
189 22.07 Warden: The study. 
190 22.08 Guard: The experiment? 
191 22.10 Warden: Yes.
192
193
22.12 Guard:  Yeah. Yeah. You know I’ve done, probably, you know, about 
20 psych experiments here and in each case I thought they were 
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pretty similar. And so I, I pretty much understand this. But er, you 












22.38 Warden: No but I’m saying, you know, above and beyond the fact that 
this is just a psych experiment, the importance of it in terms of, 
especially for people who are concerned about the correctional 
system which both Professor Zimbardo and I are. Um, you know, we
happen to agree with you that basically it’s rotten and that it doesn’t 
produce the kind of rehabilitation, quote unquote, that you would 
want to produce, and, um, and that perhaps, you know, some of the 
better ways to produce rehabilitation is to remove the things in 
society…  You know, all that stuff. I, I am very deeply committed to 
that. 




23.19 Warden: … Um, and I think all of us are. And what we’re trying to do, 
and this is what I want to try to get to you because I think you feel 
the same way. Is that true, you know?






23.21 Warden: … is, um, what we want to do is be able to, to study the thing 
that exists, or as nearly as we can make it to what exists and to, and 
to be able to go to the world with what we’ve done and say “Now 
look, this is what happens when you have Guards who behave this 
way”. 
216 23.56 Guard: OK.
217
218
















24.00 Guard: OK. Yeah. One other thing that I was thinking of is that, er, if it 
came down to like a riotous situation in the prison that would be 
pretty much analogous to, you know, any riot condition and, er, I’ve 
been in a lot of riots, you know, at Stanford and Chicago, and one at 
Grant Park last summer, and riots in France, in Paris, and of all the 
times I’ve been in a riot, um, the times, well you know like in Grant 
Park, the police just came right in, and that’s not the worst one I’ve 
ever seen for, you know, all that went on, and, er, the only time that 
anything’s ever been a particular potential bad situation nothing’s 
ever happened was in Paris where they had, they had something like 
30,000 kids all over the streets of Paris and 15,000 police and, er, 
everybody just sat there the whole day and then when the day ended 








25:23 Warden:  Well I hope it doesn’t. I’m hoping it doesn’t. And I don’t think
it will if, we use a bit of sense, you know ... But, um, but for the time
being, you know, I, we need you to play the part of, you know, tough
Guard   and forget some of the more sophisticated psychology that 





26:00 Guard:  Well I’ve met a lot of police that, er, that act a whole lot of 
different ways. You can’t do it just by the movies or something. 
‘Cause you know I’ve met plenty of police.
251 26:11 Warden:  Well, you know, I’m not... We’re trying to set up the 
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stereotype Guard, not, you know … Alright, and we realize that 
you’re going to have your own individual style. But, but so far your 
individual style has been a little bit too soft pedal.  And we want you 
to get in there, OK?




26:36 Warden: … In the counts and in other things. I mean when there’s a 
situation like this, um, to have to go in there and shout if necessary. 
And, and to be more into the action. OK?  Alright.
[26.58 Ends] 
43
